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Abstract. The paper attempts to investigate how the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact 
have impaired the capacity of EZ national authorities to conduct discretionary fiscal policy. We estimate fiscal 
determinants for the structural public deficit over the period of 1981-2010, estimating panel data equations in 
order to increase the strength of the test by enhancing the time series dimension of the data by the cross 
section. We argue that the degree of the countrecyclicality of discretionary fiscal policy has been reduced 
significantly after the Maastricht Treaty. Also, the empirical evidence shows that national fiscal rules have a 
significant positive impact in budgetary outcomes. 
Keywords: discretionary fiscal policy, countercyclicatlity, flexibility, Stability and Growth Pact, business 
cycle. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The main objective of the empirical analysis is to examine to what extent the constraints of both 
Maastricht criteria and Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) have affected the way national authorities 
conduct their discretionary fiscal policy. Provided that the monetary policy of all countries in eurozone 
is managed by the ECB, the fiscal policy undertakes the responsibility to operate as a stabilizing tool 
of the business cycle and to counteract the negative asymmetric shocks. Consequently, it is the 
foremost tool in the quiver of governments to deal with their country-specific fluctuations. For this 
reason, we would expect that the process of European integration should be linked to the adoption by 
the member-states of more countercyclical discretionary fiscal policies. On the other hand, the 
existence of the Pact sets constraints and limitations on the conduct of fiscal policy. The question we 
want to answer is whether these constraints prevent the stabilizing role of fiscal policy and if this 
hypothesis is supported by the empirical findings. 
Making clear what the stabilizing role of authorities means, the governments tend to implement 
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies during booms and loose policies during recessions so as to 
stabilize the cycle. A rational assumption is that we should expect that European monetary union 
would be associated with the conduct of more strongly countercyclical fiscal policies which will affect 
negatively the budget outcome in times of economic recession as this is the way fiscal policy plays a 
stabilizing role in business cycles. 
This analysis is based on that of Gali and Perotti (2003) aiming to amend and extend it. Specifically, 
we use historical data until the year of 2010 and we add in our model the variable of national fiscal 
rules. The latter enables us to evaluate whether the national fiscal rules can counteract political 
indiscipline and provide balanced budget outcomes. The division of the EZ countries into two 
subgroups (north – south) will provide us useful conclusions about the different effects the constraints 
have had on rich north and poor south.  
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From a methodological perspective, our empirical approach focuses on the variables that constitute 
indicators of discretionary fiscal policy such as the structural deficit or cyclically unadjusted deficit. It 
is essential to make a distinction between the changes in fiscal policy that occur as specific measures 
decided by national authorities discretionarity and the changes as a result of the general economic 
conditions that affect the automatic stabilizers. The level of the deficit consists of the cyclical deficit 
which is the result of business cycle fluctuations rising during recessions and falling during booms 
since the cyclical deficit acts as an automatic stabilizer and the structural deficit which shows how 
large the deficit would be if the economy were operating at full employment (potential real output) and 
demonstrates the impacts of the actions adopted by the national authorities whose objective is to cope 
with the endogenous or exogenous (such as the financing of a war) fluctuations of the cycle. A typical 
example of the cyclical deficit is the reduction of tax revenues and the increase of payments for social 
insurance during recessions. 
 
2 Methodological Framework        
 
The first step is to examine the stationarity characteristics of each time series. Actually, there are 
numerous econometric techniques to test for the existence of a unit root. In the current study, we use 
the popular Augmented Dickey – Fuller methodology (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1979).1  
The ADF test is based on the following regression (Kaskarelis 1993):  
 =  +  + 	
 + ∑ 
+

   
 where ∆ is the first difference operator, t is time and ε t  is the error term. 
In case the cyclical component is stationary, the secular component has a unit root and Y follows a 
random walk process i.e. the change in Y is absolutely random. Algebraically a random walk has the 
following form: Y =	 Y
 + ε. Furthermore, if α≠0, then Y follows a random walk process with a 
drift. A drift process is represented as follows:  =	 
 + α + . Note that the lag dependent 
polynomial is incorporated with the aim to deal with the potential serial correlation of the residuals.  
However, it is well-known that regarding panel data series, the standard unit root tests based on 
individual time series are not the appropriate techniques to employ as they do not work effectively. 
This is why we tend to apply panel data unit root tests that are employed in the investigation of 
statistical properties in panel data analysis. The results provided by the panel data unit root tests will 
be more reliable since the panel data analysis increases the strength of the test by enhancing the time 
series dimension of the data by the cross section. There are several panel unit root tests, some of the 
most popular are the following: the ADF - Fisher Chi-square (Maddala and Wu,1999), PP – Fisher 
Chi-square (Choi, 2001), the LLC (Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002) and the IPS (Im, Pesaran and Shin, 
2003)2. For our analysis, we use the method of ADF – Fisher Chi-square as an alternative approach to 
                                                          
1 
 There are several unit root tests that can be used such as the test of Zivot and Andrews (1992) , the IPS test (Im et al. 1997), 
the MW test (Maddala and Wu, 1999), or the Choi test (Choi, 2001). 
2
  While the LLC test allows for heterogeneity of individual deterministic effects and a heterogeneous serial correlation 
structure, it assumes the presence of a homogeneous autoregressive root under the alternative. The latter is identified as a 
serious limitation for the LLC test. The LLC test procedure involves using pooled t-statistics of the estimator to evaluate the 
hypothesis of non-stationarity of each individual time series. The more recently developed IPS tests overcame the limitation 
of the LLC test by allowing for heterogeneity of the autoregressive root under the alternative. The IPS test is simple to 
calculate and allows for residual serial correlation and heterogeneity of dynamics across groups. However, simulations 
indicate that the IPS test is sensitive to a correct choice of lag orders in the underlying ADF regressions; the power of the t-
bar test is more favorably affected by a rise in time dimension of the data than the cross-section units of the data; and the 
interpretation of the IPS test results are difficult because of the heterogeneous nature of the alternative hypothesis. Maddala 
and Wu’s (1999) and Choi’s (2001) tests were similar in the way that both suggested panel unit root tests performed using a 
Fisher statistic, but they were developed to overcome the shortcomings of the LLC and the IPS tests. Maddala and Wu’s 
(1999) and Choi’s (2001) tests solves the problems related to previously mentioned tests by providing the combination of 
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the unit root tests. The ADF – Fisher Chi-square test combines the p-values from the individual unit 
root tests and allows for individual unit root processes so that p-values vary across cross-sections. 
The ADF - Fisher Chi-square is based on the following regression (Baltagi, 2001; Fischer, 1932): 
P = -2 ∑    
The hypothesis that we have to evaluate is :		 = 1 against the alternative : 	 <1 (the series are 
weakly stationary or trend stationary). The ADF - Fisher Chi-square test was applied both on the initial 
original variables of the models and their first differences. Most of the original variables are non-
stationary however their first differences are stationary.  
Moreover, in order to choose the appropriate coefficient covariance method, we work in full 
accordance with the Arellano asymptotics (1987). If Τ (number of periods) is greater than Ν (number 
of cross sections) and T<2N we use the method of White diagonal with Cross Section weights, while if 
Τ>2Ν we use the method of White Cross section with Cross Section SUR weights. As a result, for 
models 2,4 we use the method of White diagonal while for models 1,3, the method of White Cross 
section. 
Finally, our sample consists of the data of the 11 first members – states of eurozone (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece3, Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) for the time period of 
1981 – 2010 capturing inter alia the traces of the current crisis. Source of the data is the database of 
OECD. 
 
3 Panel Data Regressions and Empirical Analysis Results  
 
A useful starting point for our empirical analysis would be to regress the following relation: 
d = a + βX + d
 + u      (1) 
where d is the deficit of general government as a share of GDP, X is the output gap and d
 is the 
lagged variable of deficit. 
The concept is to regress an indicator of fiscal policy on a cyclical indicator, so we will estimate the 
relation between the cyclically unadjusted deficit of general government and the output gap which is 
an economic measure of the difference between the actual output of an economy and the potential 
output (the output that can be produced at full employment). The use of the lagged variable helps us to 
account for the likely of error autocorrelation and it allows explanatory variables to have effects 
beyond the current period.  
Even though this relation does not identify the systemic response of national authorities as 
discretionary policy to the fluctuations of the cycle, it provides a useful descriptive relation between 
public finances and cyclical activity. Our results demonstrate the contribution of cyclical conditions on 
the implementation of balanced or surplus budgets and hence on the ensuring of the sustainability of 
public debt.    
The table displays the results for our specification. Even if our model is simplistic, it has an appealing 
interpretative capacity.  The explanatory variables are statistically significant at the significance level 
of 95%. Particularly, the results demonstrate a clear positive relation between the level of cyclically 
unadjusted deficit and the output gap. A reduction in the negative output gap or an increase in the 
positive output gap by 1%, would reduce the level of deficit by 0,5%. It would be wrong to conclude 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
probability values for a unit root tests applied to each group in the data set. With this in mind, we employed the LLC, the IPS, 
ADF-Fisher and PP-Fisher panel unit root tests in this paper. For the LLC and IPS test, the optimal lag length is determined 
according to Schwarz criteria.  
3
 Greece joined EMU in 2001. 
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that the national authorities tend to conduct procyclical fiscal policy due to the fact that we have not 
used the appropriate indicators of discretionary policy in our specification. 
Interpreting the empirical results of the model 1, they highlight the weaknesses in the structure of SGP. 
Regarding the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) which entagles the imposition of fines in case there 
is a deficit in excess of 3% of GDP, we approve of the reviews which state that the SGP restricts the 
necessary flexibility fiscal policy should have in order to stabilize the cycle. Moreover, the SGP should 
take into account the growth rate of member-states and also their position into the business cycle since 
the rule refers to the cyclically unadjusted deficit (debt dynamics equation: g – t + (r – x)b = b# ) and to 
the structural deficit.  
In order to examine how authorities utilize fiscal policy as a tool to stabilize the fluctuation of business 
cycle, we use the structural deficit as an indicator of fiscal policy stance. Firstly, we should determine 
properly the timing of fiscal policy decisions so as to define the nature of the variable the national 
authorities react to. Actually, the measures are usually decided approximately a year before their 
implementation, excluding exceptional cases. Therefore, national authorities’ decisions should be 
based on the expectation of the output gap, conditional available on information available in the period 
t-1 ($
 %).  However, reality proves that the process of policy making is characterized by 
complexity and inconsistency, so a plausible assumption would be that the structural deficit responds 
to the output gap in the period t-1, rejecting a forward looking approach. Furthermore, in our model we 
incorporate the variable of the measure of gross debt relative to potential output gap as a debt 
stabilization motive (Gali and Perotti, 2003; Bohn, 1998; Wyplosz, 2002) and the variable of the 
lagged dependent variable (by one year) in order to avoid autocorrelation error and to deal with 
endogeneity possibilities4.  The introduction of these two explanatory variables enables us also to take 
into account the initial limitations faced by the government. The resulting specification we estimate is 
the following: 
d
∗
 = a + βX
 + β'b
 + b(d

∗
 + u      (2) 
where d∗	is	the structural deficit divided by potential output, X
 is the output gap for the period t-1, 
b
 is the gross debt of general government as a share of GDP for the period t-1 and d
∗  is the  
lagged dependent variable.  
A negative (positive) value of the coefficient β implies that fiscal authorities use discretionary fiscal 
policy in a countercyclical (procyclical) way. A negative value of the coefficient	β', as well as a value 
of the coefficient b( less than 1, implies that policymakers are subject to initial restrictions regarding 
the level of deficit and debt (Gali and Perotti, 2003). The higher the initial level of debt or deficit, the 
lower they conduct strongly countercyclical discretionary policy. Since our primary objective is to 
detect whether the constraints of Maastricht criteria and SGP have impaired the way policymakers 
conduct discretionary fiscal policy, we split our sample into two sub periods: the pre-Maastricht period 
and the post-Maastricht period. The first sub period covers observations for the period from 1981 to 
1991 (one year before the criteria of Maastricht Treaty come into force).  The empirical results for this 
period will demonstrate the tendency of policymakers in fiscal policy making process and how they 
conduct discretionary policy without constraints and limitations. We estimate the following version: 
d
∗
 = a + β./X
 + β'b
 + b(d

∗
 + u     (2a) 
where the initials BM and ΑΜ refer to pre-Maastricht and post-Maastricht periods respectively.    
Looking at the results of the model 2a from the table, in the pre-Maastrich period when governments 
had at their disposal also the monetary policy as a stabilizing tool, they tended to utilize the tools of 
                                                          
4
 Dealing with the problem of endogeneity is a complicated task. In econometric theory, it is vague whether a variable is 
endogenous or exogenous. It depends on the assumptions made by the analyst and his theoretical background. A way to deal 
with the “fear” of endogeneity is to use an instrumental variable which allows consistent estimation when the dependent 
variable causes at least one of the explanatory variables. That means that there is a reverse causation and our results are 
biased.  
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fiscal policy in a systemic countercyclical way. The coefficient of output gap has a negative value 
which indicates that policymakers conduct restrictive fiscal policy during booms and loose fiscal 
policy during recessions. As far as the initial restrictions are concerned, we notice that initial 
limitations exist only in respect of the initial level of deficit, while the higher the initial debt, the lower 
the structural deficit national authorities set discretionarily. The magnitude of the gross debt does not 
constitute a deterrent factor for the adoption of countercyclical fiscal policy. Note that both the model 
and the independent variables are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.   
The second sub period under examination covers the period from 1992 (when the criteria of Maastricht 
came into force regarding the membership in eurozone) to 2010 including the effects of the adoption 
of the supranational rule for EZ member states. 
d
∗
 = a + β0/X
 + β'b
 + b(d

∗
 + u    (2b) 
The results of the analysis support our hypothesis that the integration of monetary policy with a clear 
mandate to the focus on the target of price stability is associated with countercyclical fiscal policies in 
the EMU countries even if the flexibility of fiscal policy is being reduced when the medium-term 
target of the SGP has not been achieved. Nevertheless, even though the explanatory variable is not 
statistically significant at level lower than 20%, there is an indicative tendency of a significant 
reduction in the degree of countercyclicality of discretionary fiscal policy. Additionally, it is concluded 
that the supranational fiscal rule for the level of deficit has significantly limited the capacity of 
policymakers to use fiscal policy a stabilizing tool of the cycle as the empirical data confirm the failure 
of member-states (especially France and Germany) to comply with the rule. 
Now, we repeat the same exercise, having divided our sample into two sub groups. We split our 
sample of countries into the poor south or PIGS (including Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland) 
and the rich north (including Germany, France, Finland, Austria, Belgium and Netherlands). This will 
enable us to extract the different features and the asymmetries between the two sub groups as far as the 
conduct of fiscal policy is related.  The pattern that emerges, shows that the southern European 
countries run systematically countercyclical discretionary fiscal policies in the post-Maastricht period 
which is statistically significant at 0,05 level, but there is a reduction in the degree of 
countercyclicality from the pre-Maastricht period which is statistically significant at 0,10 level. On the 
other hand, regarding the northern countries, they appear to conduct procyclical discretionary policies 
in the post-Maastricht period in contrast to the previous when there is a statistically significant 
negative relation between structural deficit and output gap. The above finding demonstrates an aspect 
of the decreasing synchronization among the counterparts of eurozone5.   
Following the lead of several authors, we also incorporate into our model the independent variable of 
national numerical fiscal rules (Iara and Wolff,2010; Debrun et al., 2008 Ayuso-i-Casals et al., 2006; 
Commission, 2007; Deroose et al., 2006). Apart from the rules imposed by the SGP, there are 
numerous national fiscal rules which are designed to prevent the decline of public finances and to hit 
the profligacy of governments. A concise definition of the national fiscal rule is the one proposed by 
Kopits and Symansky (1998) which defines the national fiscal rule as "a permanent constraint on fiscal 
policy, expressed in terms of a summary indicator of fiscal performance”. In order to meet the needs of 
the scientific research, Commission firstly compiled a dataset on national fiscal rules in force across 
EU countries and then created the Fiscal Rule Strength Index which evaluates numerically the strength 
and the efficiency of domestic fiscal rules. Five criteria have been taken into consideration: the 
statutory/legal base of the rule, the room for setting or revising objectives, the nature of the body in 
charge of monitoring respect and enforcement of the rule, the enforcement mechanisms of the rule and 
the media visibility of the rule6. The ranking of the index takes values from -1,12 to 1,547. The use of 
                                                          
5
 Papageorgiou et al. (2010) testify a decreasing synchronization among the counterparts of the emu zone after the 
introduction of the euro coin". 
6http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/documents/fiscal_rules_calculation_fiscal_rule_index
_2010.pdf 
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the variable of national fiscal rules enables us to evaluate the contribution of domestic restrictions on 
the conduct of balanced budgetary outcomes and to what extend their strength affects the level of the 
structural deficit produced. The resulting specification that we estimate is thus: 
d
∗
 = a + β X
 + β'b
 + b(d

∗
 + β1f +		u     (3) 
The most natural interpretation of the above findings is that there is an undeniably positive relation 
between domestic fiscal rules index and the level of structural deficit. The higher the fiscal rule 
strength index is for a country, the greater contribution of domestic constraints on the level of deficit 
produced. However, this relation is not statistically significant at a level lower than 25%. Moreover we 
find that the presence of national numerical fiscal rules increase the extent of countercyclicality of 
fiscal policy.  Finally, it must be noted that there is a strong negative relation between the output gap 
for the period t-1 and the structural deficit for the period which proves one more time that governments 
run strongly countercyclical discretionary fiscal policy. 
 
4  Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper made an attempt to answer a crucial economic question regarding the degree to which the 
limitations of Maastricht criteria and SGP have impaired the ability of national authorities to run 
countercyclical discretionary fiscal policy in the EMU context approaching the time period 1981-2010.  
Estimating the model adopted, several interesting conclusions emerge. Firstly, discretionary fiscal 
policy has become less countercyclical overtime as we have found a significant reduction in the degree 
of countercyclicality of discretionary fiscal policy. Secondly, there are differences in the manner the 
two sub groups of EZ countries conduct their discretionary fiscal policy indicating inter alia a 
decreasing synchronization among the member states of euro area. More precisely, the countries that 
form the PIGS are found to run to some extent countercyclical policies while the northern countries 
tend to conduct procyclical fiscal policies after the process of monetary integration. Finally, the 
empirical findings confirm the popular view that the adoption of national fiscal rules is associated with 
more sound fiscal policy and fiscal discipline.  
A question remain unanswered is the extent to which the new version of the revised SGP that is 
associated with more severe rules, enforcement mechanisms and automatic sanctions, will affect the 
degree of flexibility of discretionary fiscal policy to be used as a stabilizing tool. Also, a further 
refinement of our approach would account for the existence of political business cycle in the 
formulation of fiscal policy.  
Concluding, we want to stress that readers should take into account the limitations associated with the 
empirical analysis and not to overestimate the findings provided. What is more, we would rather to 
consider our remarks and findings as useful caveats to the debate opened about the future of EMU. It is 
apparent that future and more extended research on the topic would be of great interest.    
 
5 Appendix 
 
Table of the Panel Data Regression Results 
Independent 
variables  
Model 1 Model 2 (a-b) Model 2 (southern countries) 
 
Output gap t-1  -0.167585 
(-2.017307)* 
-0.047525 
(-1.243943) 
-0.255622 
(-1.823910)** 
-0,089698 
(-1,917188)** 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/fiscal_rules/index_en.htm 
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Independent 
variables  
Model 1 Model 2 (a-b) Model 2 (southern countries) 
 
Gross debt t-1   0.087848 
(2.383029)* 
0.024174 
(3.791262)* 
0,151052 
(5,757249)* 
0,027754 
(3,016101)* 
Lagged adjusted 
deficit  
 0.288348 
(2.084699)* 
0.813873 
(19.52911)* 
0,336790 
(2,133473)* 
0,812107 
(15,27963)* 
Output gap  0.499090 
(5.510424)* 
 
   
Deficit t-1 0.715293 
(9.988716)* 
 
   
Fiscal Rules Index   
   
Constant  -0.741778 
(-3.126519)* 
-9.828870 
(-3.392398)* 
-2.192489 
(-4.494069)* 
-17,11492 
(-8,660905)* 
-2,889977 
(-3,542233)* 
R2  0.759422 0.841258 0.874724 0.694813 0,838122 
Durbin-Watson  
stat 1.530709 1.612692 1.856546 1.559896 1,693448 
F-stat 75.08105 32.23887 104.7353 8,130985 64,34871 
Countries included  11 10 11 5 5 
Total panel 
observations  283 86 209 33 95 
Coef. Covariance 
Method 
White Cross 
section White diagonal 
White 
diagonal 
White Cross 
section 
White Cross 
section 
Period 1981 - 2010 1981 - 1991 1992 - 2010 1981 – 1991 1992 - 2010 
 
 
Independent 
variables  
Model  2 (northern countries) Model 3 
Output gap t-1 -0.131373 
(-2.161651)* 
0.065972 
(1.050242) 
-0.092046 
(-2.108149)*  
Gross debt t-1 0.012280 
(0.639387) 
0.015535 
(1.723184)** 
0.019723 
(2.666155)*  
Lagged adjusted 
deficit 
0.363182 
(4.012788)* 
0.7443 
(11.70722)* 
0.823360 
(20.25733)*  
Output gap 
  
 
 
Deficit t-1 
  
 
 
Fiscal Rules Index 
  
0.202563 
(1.152632)  
Constant -3.303735 
(-2.4966613)* 
-1.329439 
(-2.037808)* 
-1.823903 
(-3.387655)*  
R2  0.852416 0.839483 0.872487  
Durbin-Watson  
stat 2.263396 2.062901 1.928381  
F-stat 37.13004 68.64201 91.88301  
Countries included  5 6 11  
Total panel 
observations  53 114 114  
Coef. Covariance 
Method 
White Cross 
section 
White Cross 
section White diagonal  
Period 1981 - 1991 1992 - 2010 1992 - 2010  
 
In parenthesis are depicted the t-stat values. Model 1: dependent variable is the cyclically unadjusted deficit as a share of GDP. 
Model 2,3: dependent variable is the structural deficit as a share of potential GDP. * the independent variable is statistically 
significant at 0.05, ** the independent variable is statistically significant at 0.10. 
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